Townsend Harris's Letter to Lewis Cass, Correspondence No. 19 from Letterbook 3
To the Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State. Simoda July 8/58
Sir, In my dispatch No. 1 of the present year, I had the honor to inform you of the state of my negotiations with the Japanese. Two days after my return to Simoda, I was seized with a very dangerous nervous turn, which soon after showed symptoms of putrid fever, and I remained in a critical situation, until the first of April last. His majesty the Tycoon and the Council of State, manifested a deep concern, on hearing of my illness. Two of the best of the Imperial physicians who had been taught by the Dutch surgeons at Nagasaki, were sent at once from Yedo to this place. The Tycoon constantly sent me very kind messages, accompanied with presents of such things, as he thought might aid my recovery. Daily bulletins were sent by the physicians to Yedo, and on the receipt at that place of a bulletin, stating that my case was hopeless, the doctors received percumptory orders, to cure me, and that if I died, they would themselves be in peril. I mention these particulars to show the kindly disposition of the Japanese, perhaps I might add, that is proved, that my three months residence in Yedo, had not made an unfavorable impression on the Japanese authorities. On the 15th of April, I again left Simoda for Yedo, against the strong remonstrances of the physicians, and noforwithstanding that I was so weak, that I had to be carried on board the steamer. Happily I did not suffer any relapse, and am now quite recovered. On my arrival at Yedo, I was informed, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had not yet returned from Kioto, (to which place he went in envoy to the Mikado), and that nothing could be done until he returned. I received a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, containing the same statements, and regretting that the pledges to sign the treaty on the 20th of April could not be kept, and requesting me to grant them further time. I transmit herewith the Dutch version of the letter with an English translation of the same, numbered 1. Mr. J.H. Donker Curtis, the Dutch superintendent of trade at Nagasaki and Dutch commissioner to Japan, arrived in Yedo, on the 23rd of April, and had an audience with the Tycoon on the 8th of May. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not return to Yedo, until the 1st of June, and on the 5th of that month I had an interview with him. The minister opened the business by recapitulating the causes, that led to the postponement of the signing of the treaty, at this segment, the dispatch of an embassy to Kioto, and that they had not signed the treaty at the date specified; he said that since the ascension to power of the present dynasty of the Tycoon, only three missions had been sent to the Mikado, the two first of which accomplished the object of their mission, within ten days of their arrival at Kioto, while the third of which he was a member, had remained there fifty days. He said, that he found a very alarming excitement, existed among the people, that the Mikado had received letters from some of the most powerful of the Daimyos, remonstrating against the treaty, made with the Americans, and warning him, that great evils would ensue, if he gave his assent to it. The Mikado was much alarmed and troubled, he did not refuse his assent to the treaty, but told the envoy, that they must take more time, and reconcile the dissenting Daimyos, and that as soon as the present effervescence was quieted, he would give his assent. The minister said, that the Tycoon and Council of State were strongly in favor of the treaty as made, that they would adhere to it's provisions, and that it should go into effect, that they well understood how greatly the treaty would benefit Japan, but that many of the Daimyos were not so well informed, and from that cause they opposed the treaty, that he desired a further postponement of the signing of the treaty, for the purpose of quietly reconciling the Daimyos, and thus preventing a civil war, from breaking out in Japan. The minister closed by saying, that the commissioners who had negotiated the treaty with me, could communicate to me, the precise time, which they wished me to grant. In answer to this I said, I hardly knew, what reply to make, that it was as I believed, unprecedented for a government to carry on negotiations, when they had not the power to sign them when complete, that it would give foreign powers a most unfavorable opinion of the Tycoons government, and the. Fish might refuse to hold any negotiations except with the representatives of the mikado, and under his full powers, that it behooved the government of Yedo, to beware of the danger they were incurring by the display of weakness, which was rather calculated to simulate the resistance of the Daimyos, than to allay it; that I would hear what propositions the commissioners might have to make to me, and then would give my decision. The following day, the commissioners visited me. So far as I can ascertain the truth in this singular country, I believe the following to describe the actual position of the Daimyos or princes of Japan. The princes are of two classes, one class being hereditary and holding landed possessions of greater or less extent, these are called the Daimyos, the other class is composed of titular princes, whose titles are not hereditary and who are not all possessed of landed estates, these are called Kami. The Daimyos are 360 in number, of these 18 are of the ancient princes of Japan, whose titles date long anterior to the period, when Yeyas founded the present Tycoon dynasty. These princes are supreme in their own territories, having absolute power of life and death, and the control of the whole income of their principality, so absolute is their authority, that even an Imperial officer cannot enter their dominions without having obtained their consent. Among the 18 princes, the most powerful are Kaga and Satsuma, it is said the former can bring 60,000 men into the field. The remaining 342 Daimyos only date from the days of Yeyas, their possessions being derived from the subdivision of the estates if the Daimyos, who opposed the occupation of Yeyas, are comparatively small, and they are more fully under the control of the government than of the 18 first named, who supported the usurper, and from this fact the 18 are said to call themselves the friends of the Tycoon, but not his subjects. It appears that for more than two hundred years, Japan has been ruled by unchangeable laws, that all classes from the Daimyo to the peasant, bow submissively to them; that so long as the government keeps within the limits of those laws, its authority is not questioned; the laws compel all the Daimyos to keep their families in Yedo, and themselves are only allowed to be six months in the year in their own territories, the remainder of the year must be passed in Yedo. When visiting their own possessions, they are not allowed to take either wife or child with them, all must remain in Yedo, this rule applies to the Kamiaro as well as to the Daimyos, and the perpetual confinement of their families in Yedo seems to contradict the assertion of independence and supreme power in their own territories, which is claimed for the 18 ancient princes; it appears to be one of those paradoxes, which Japan alone offers to the world. In February last fourteen of the eighteen great princes were opposed to the treaty; among the four in favor of it, was the prince of Satsuma, who is father in law to the Tycoon, and already named as one of the more powerful of the princes. I could not learn the grounds taken by the fourteen Daimyos against the treaty, except that it was against ancient laws. I am inclined to think, that they fear, that this power may be weakened if not overthrown, by a free intercourse of the Japanese with foreigners. The first and last maxim of the Daimyos is "that land is happy, that never departs from it's ancient laws". For two hundred years Japan has enjoyed profound peace, unmolested by foreign or domestic troubles, her people frugal in their habits, have never felt the absence of luxury on the one hand, of the presence of want on the other, probably no part of the world can show a people as well fed, clad and lodged, and so little overworked, as is to be seen, in Japan, as the present day. Shut up by their system of inclusion, they have heard but little and perhaps cared less, about the events, that have convulsed other nations, during the last two hundred and fifty years, is it not therefore to be wondered at, that many of them should be opposed to any alteration of a system, which has secured their tranquility and happiness, for so long a time. The government of Yedo, has never been called on to exercise any energy or boldness of action, they are therefore quite unprepared to meet the present state of things, by a coup d'état. The commissioners assured me, that the Tycoon and council of state was fully resolved to carry the treaty into effect, that they did not ask any alterations of its conditions, but required time, to enable themselves to bring the daimyos to reason. They said the government had the power to crush the opposition by force, that they shrunk with horror from the idea of bloodshed, that the time they asked for accomplishing that purpose was until the 27th of the 7th month (September 4/58), that if I would agree to this delay, the council of state would write me a letter in which they would pledge their faith and that of the Tycoon, that the treaty should positively be signed on the date named above, no matter what might be the state of public opinion at that time. I now found myself in the same position, that I was in on the 17th of February, as described in my No. 1 of the present year, and that I must again decide, whether to break off the negotiations or to accur to their request. The Japanese had given the Dutch commission a copy of the treaty they have negotiated with me, and he was aware of the decide of the Japanese, to postpone the execution of it. He openly avowed his intention to negotiate such a commercial treaty, as would not be objected to, by the Daimyos, and said, that if subsequently the American treaty was signed, the additional privileges would accrue to the Dutch, and thus Holland would secure the great credit of having made the first commercial treaty with Japan. I have no doubt, that, had I broken off the negotiations, a treaty would have at once been made, as desired by the Dutch commissioner. In addition to the loss of credit to the U.S., I had also to consider, that the fact of the Dutch, having made such a treaty, would greatly embarrass any future negotiations, for the obtaining of the provisions, omitted in the Dutch treaty, if it did not entirely defeat them. After mature deliberation, I determined to accede to the request of the Japanese, provided they would also pledge themselves in writing, not to sign any treaty or convention with another power, until the expiration of thirty days after the signing of the American treaty. This proposition was accepted by the Council of State, who subsequently wrote me a letter, expressing the conditions already stated. I transmit herewith a copy of the Dutch version of the letter, with an English translation of the same, numbered 2. This document may fairly be considered as a virtual execution and ratification of the treaty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs delivered to me a large box, containing a letter from the Tycoon, addressed to the President of the United States. I was assured that no letter had been addressed by the Tycoon to any foreign power, for more than two hundred and fifty years, and that the answers to the letters of the king of Holland, were written by the Council of State. A Dutch version of the letter was also handed to me, a copy of which with an English translation of the same, I transmit herewith, numbered 3. Having no further immediate business in Yedo, I returned on this place on the 18th ultimo. |